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LaFrance: Innovations Palpitations: The Confusing Status of Geographically

INNOVATIONS PALPITATIONS: THE
CONFUSING STATUS OF GEOGRAPHICALLY
MISDESCRIPTIVE TRADEMARKS
May gaFrance*
The United States' two major international trade agreements of the
1990s-the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)1 and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 2-included intellectual property
provisions that led Congress to amend a number of federal intellectual property
statutes, including, inter alia, the Lanham Act provisions dealing with federal
registration of trademarks.3 Specifically, pursuant to Article 1712 of NAFTA,
Congress revised the rules that determine whether, and under what circumstances,
federal registration is permitted for trademarks that contain geographical
indications of origin.4 In the decade since these enactments, it appeared that the
courts had reached a reasonable interpretation of the amendments. Recently,
however, the NAFTA amendments to the federal trademark registration rules
have received a new and somewhat troubling interpretation.
In two decisions during 2003, the Federal Circuit addressed the Lanham Act
standards for federal registration of geographically misdescriptive trademarks-that is, trademarks which imply a geographic origin that is inaccurate.
These cases, In re CaliforniaInnovations,Inc.' (addressing trademarks for goods) and
In re LesHalles de ParisJ.V.6 (addressing service marks), interpreted sections 2(e) (3)
and 2(f) of the Lanham Act in a manner that allows this category of
misdescriptive trademarks to be registered on the Principal Register of the Patent
and Trademark Office, provided that they are not deceptive within the meaning
of section 2(a).

* William S. Boyd Professor ofLaw, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. The author wishes to thank Dina Christiansen '04 for her valuable research assistance.
' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Lix,;A], INSTLJRUMI--RlESUJITS OF [HE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 17, 33 I.L.M. 1125,1154 [hereinafter GATT].
2 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1993, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 605
[hereinafter NAFTA].
3 Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2003).
4 North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182,107 Stat.
2057 (1993) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 3301-3473 (2004)) [hereinafter NAFTA
Implementation Act]; Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. % 3501-3624 (2004)).
s 329 F.3d 1334, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1853 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
6 334 F.3d 1371, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539 (Fed. Cit. 2003).
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As discussed below, the Federal Circuit's interpretation of the NAFTA
amendments to section 2 of the Lanham Act may be contrary to the legislative
intent underlying those amendments] While the court's approach is not
unreasonable as a matter of policy-and may even represent a policy choice more
sound than that made by Congress when it enacted the NAFTA amendments-it
appears to be inconsistent with both the text and the legislative history of these
registration provisions. Furthermore, contrary to fundamental canons of
statutory construction, the court's interpretation renders section 2(e)(3) of the
statute superfluous and the last sentence of section 2(f arguably inoperative.
I. BACKGROUND: THE NAFTA AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 2 OF THE
LANHAM ACT
A. THE PRE-NAFTA VERSION OF SECTION

2

Before the United States entered into NAFTA in 1993, geographically
misdescriptive marks faced the same barriers to registration as other
misdescriptive marks. If the mark was geographically inaccurate, it could be
registered if it was arbitrary (such as the classic and apocryphal "Alaska" mark for
bananas) since there was precious little likelihood that the inaccuracy would
confuse consumers.' If the mark was geographically inaccurate but "deceptively
misdescriptive"-in other words, if consumers might believe it to be true-the
potential for confusion could, in some cases, be alleviated once the mark had
become distinctive of the applicant's goods or services-that is, once it acquired
secondary meaning pursuant to section 2(f). 9 For example, "Chicago" could be
registered as a trademark for root beer made in Milwaukee once consumers had
come to recognize it as the maker's trademark rather than as an indicator of the
geographic origin of the product. In other cases, however, registration was
conclusively barred; the conclusive bar applied to misdescriptive geographic
marks that also qualified as "deceptive" within the meaning of section 2(a). As
"deceptive" came to be defined by the Federal Circuit, this conclusive bar applied
to marks that falsely implied a geographical origin that would be a materialfactor

7 See infra, Part I.B.
8

See In re Wada, 194 F.3d 1297, 1300, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In r

Loew's Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d 764,767,226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 865,867 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re House
of Windsor, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 53 (T.T.A.B. 1983); In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95,98 n.5,
213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 889, 892 n.8 (C.C.P.A. 1982). Arbitrary marks are considered inherendy
distinctive, and thus are eligible for registration without a showing of secondary meaning. See, e.g.,
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976).
' § 2(0,15 U.S.C. § 1052(0.
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in a typical consumer's purchasing decision.'° Thus, for example, the "Carolina"
mark for tobacco grown in New Jersey would be conclusively barred from
registration as "deceptive" under section 2(a) because not only would consumers
believe that the tobacco came from the Carolinas, they would also be motivated
to purchase that brand of tobacco because they believed it was grown in a famous
tobacco-producing region, and therefore would, in all likelihood, be a superior
quality product. In contrast, the "Chicago" mark for root beer made in
Milwaukee would be misleading but essentially harmless, since most consumers
would not prefer a Chicago root beer over a Milwaukee root beer. Therefore, the
"Chicago" mark could be registered for root beer once consumers came to
recognize it as a trademark rather than as an indication of geographic origin.
Unlike "Chicago" for non-Chicago root beer, courts would consider the
"Carolina" mark for non-Carolina tobacco deceptive and harmful to consumers,
and it therefore could not be registered even after becoming distinctive of the
applicant's goods or services. After all, even after most consumers had come to
recognize "Carolina" as a trademark, consumers new to the market might still
mistake it as an indication of geographic origin, and make a purchasing decision
based on this erroneous belief.

See In reHouse of Windsor,221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 53. In this case the Board articulated the test
for a conclusive bar. The court held that "Bahia" as a mark for cigars made from tobacco grown
elsewhere was deceptive, because Bahia was a region specially known for the quality of its tobacco:
If the evidence shows that the geographical area named in the mark is an area
sufficiently renowned to lead purchasers to make a goods-place association but
the record does not show that goods like applicant's or goods related to
applicant's are a principal product of that geographical area, then the deception
will most likely be found not to be material and the mark, therefore, not
deceptive. On the other hand, if there is evidence that goods like applicant's or
goods related to applicant's are a principal product of the geographical area
named by the mark, then the deception will most likely be found material and the
mark, therefore, deceptive.
It is a bit risky to suggest the kind or amount of evidence that would be
sufficient to establish that goods like or related to applicant's come from a
particular geographical region, but we are willing to take that risk in the attempt
to give some guidance to Examining Attorneys and applicants. For us, in the
ordinary case, if the record contains a concession that the area named by the
mark has, as one of its principal products, applicant's goods or related goods or
if the record contains a reliable gazeteer entry (or the like) to the effect that
applicant's goods (or sufficiently related goods) are a principal product of the
geographical area named by the mark, such evidence is sufficient to establish the
materiality of the deception.
Id at 57 (citations omitted) (citing Daphne Leeds, Trademarks--The Raionaleof Registrabity, 26 G1,0.
WASH. L. RIv. 653, 662-63 (1958)).
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Prior to the 1993 NAFTA Amendments to section 2, the Federal Circuit and
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) developed a two-part test to determine
whether a geographic mark was primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive within the meaning of section 2(e), and therefore barred from
registration unless it had acquired distinctiveness under section 2(f):
Whether a mark is primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive under § 2(e)(2) requires an analysis under a two
prong test to establish (1) whether the primary significance of the
mark as it is used is a generally known geographic place; and (2)
whether the public would make a "goods/place association, i.e.,
believe that the goods for which the mark is sought to be registered
originate in that place."11
The pre-NAFTA two-part test for geographically deceptively misdescriptivemarks
under section 2(e) was distinguished from the three-part test for truly deceptive
geographic marks under section 2(a) in In re House of Windsor, a 1983 decision of
the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (TTAB).1 2 Both tests required that the
mark be primarily geographically misdescriptive. If the public would make a
"goods/place association" between the goods and the geographic indicator-that
is, if the public would conclude that the mark "imparts information about the
geographical origin of the goods," then the geographic mark was deceptively

" Institut Nat'l Des Appellations D'Origine v. Vintners Int'l Co., 958 F.2d 1574, 1580, 22
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting In reSociete Generale Des Eaux Minerales
de Vittel, S.A., 824 F.2d 957, 959, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450, 1452 (Fed. Cit. 1987); In re Loew's
Theatres, 769 F.2d at 767; In reNantucket, 677 F.2d at 98-99). The Federal Circuit derived this test
from the decision of its predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in In r Nantucket,
667 F.2d at 99, which held that:
As the courts have made plain, geographically deceptive misdescriptiveness
cannot be determined without considering whether the public associates the
goods with the place which the mark names. If the goods do not come from the
place named, and the public makes no goods-place association, the public is not
deceived and the mark is accordingly not geographically deceptively
misdescriptive.
As recently as 1999, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed this formulation in In reWada, 194 F.3d at 12991300 (citing InstitutNat'l Des Appelaions D'Origine, 958 F.2d at 1580):
The Board found that the mark NEW YORK WAYS GALLERY was primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive when applied to the goods in Wada's
application. For a mark to be primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive,
the mark must (1) have as its primary significance a generally known geographic
place, and (2) identify products that purchasers are likely to believe mistakenly
are connected with that location.
12 In reHouse of Windsor, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 53.
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misdescriptive under section 2(e).' 3 Thus, the TTAB held that the "Bahia" mark
for cigars made elsewhere was at least deceptively misdescriptive, because Bahia
"is a place where tobacco is grown and where cigars are made."' 4 The question
whether the mark was also deceptiveunder section 2(a), the Board noted, was more
"perplexing":
The distinction between a mark which is primarily geographically
deceptively misdescriptive under Section 2(e)(2) of the Trademark
Act and a geographical mark which is deceptive within the meaning
of Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act is not immediately apparent
from a reading of the Act. The Act's legislative history is, likewise,
far from clear about the intended distinction between a mark that
is to be denied registration as primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive and one that is to be denied registration as deceptive.
In fact, the legislative history suggests that at least some of the
drafters perceived no distinction at all. The ambiguity in legislative
intent notwithstanding, basic rules of statutory construction compel
us to find that there is a distinction between a primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark (which can be registered with
proof of distinctiveness under Section 2(o) and a deceptive
geographical mark (which is unregistrable even under the provisions
of Section 2()).5
Acknowledging that its prior decisions had articulated varying standards for
deceptiveness under section 2(a), the TTAB settled on what it perceived to be the
best approach: determining "whether the deception is materialto the purchasing
decision."' 6 The TTAB expanded on the meaning of this test by quoting thenAssistant Commissioner Daphne Leeds:
Are purchasers likely to care whether or not the product comes
from the place or region which the mark identifies? If the answer
is in the negative, the mark is "deceptively misdescriptive" but if the
affirmative, it is "deceptive" and unregistrable under another
provision of the Act. This is to say that if a locality identified by a
geographical name or term is known or noted for the production of

,3 Id at 55.
14 Id
15 Id. at

56 (omitted) (citing Heating on H.K 102, HA 5461, and S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on

Tradkmarks of the House Comm. on Patents,77th Cong., 83 (1941)).
16 Id at 56 (emphasis added).
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goods in the category of applicant's, or for components of such
goods, and purchasers are moved by the geographical name to buy
the goods in the belief that they originate in the locality name, the
geographical name or term is "deceptive" as applied to the goods. 7
The TTAB also attempted to describe the evidentiary showing that would
support a finding of materiality under section 2(a), and concluded that this finding
would generally be warranted where goods of the type in question were "a
principal product" of the region identified by the mark:"8
In embracing a "materiality" test to distinguish marks that fall
within the proscription of Section 2(e)(2) from those that fall also
within the proscription of Section 2(a), we are really saying no more
than that we must look to the evidence that has been presented
about the probable reaction of purchasers to a particular geographical term when it is applied to particular goods. If the evidence
shows that the geographical area named in the mark is an area
sufficiently renowned to lead purchasers to make a goods-place
association but the record does not show that goods like applicant's
or goods related to applicant's are a principal product of that
geographical area, then the deception will most likely be found not
to be material and the mark, therefore, not deceptive. On the other
hand, f there is evidence that goods like applicant's or goods related to
applicant'sare aprincipalproductofthe geographicalareanamed by the mark,
then the deceplion will most likey befound materialand the mark, therefore,
deceptive.19
In the case of services, the test for determining whether a service mark was
"primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive" under section 2(e) was a
slightly heightened version of the two-part test applicable to trademarks for goods
under section 2(e). In In re Municipal CapitalMarketsCorp.,2 ° the TTAB held that
the evidence necessary to satisfy the second prong of the two-part test under
section 2(e) must do "something more than merely establish that services as
ubiquitous as restaurant services are offered in the pertinent geographic location"

Id at 57 (quoting Leeds, supra note 10, at 662-63).
Id at 17.
Id. at 57 (emphasis added) (concluding that "Bahia" was deceptive, as applied to cigars,
because tobacco is a principal product of Bahia); see also Kenneth B. Germain, Trademark Regis/ration
UnderSections 2(a) and 2(e) ofthe LanhamAct: The Deception Decision, 44 FORDHAM L. RF.V. 249 (1975)
(discussing the distinctions between section 2(e) and section 2(a)).
"0 In re Mun. Capital Mkts. Corp., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369, 1370-71 (T.T.A.B. 1999).
's
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in order to establish the requisite goods/place association. 21 Although the Board
was unable to specify precisely what that "something more" might be, the Board
held that, in this case, it was not necessary to prove that the location
(Cooperstown, New York) was "well known" for the services in question
(restaurant services).22 Rather, the necessary degree of association might be
established by showing that the location had "somewhat greater numbers of
restaurants offering a particular type of cuisine than normally would be expected
for a town or city of that size." 23
B. THE NAFTA AMENDMENTS

In the NAFTA Implementation Act of 1993,24 Congress amended section 2
of the Lanham Act in response to the United States' entry into the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).25 The 1993 amendments changed
the language of sections 2(e) and 2(f) so that geographically deceptively
misdesciptive marks became a category distinct from other types of deceptively
misdescriptive marks.
Prior to the NAFTA amendments, section 2(e) barred registration of a
trademark or service mark that:
(e) Consists of a mark which, (1) when used on or in connection
with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively
misdescriptive of them, or (2) when used on or in connection with
the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive or
deceptively misdescriptive of them,... or (3) is primarily merely a
surname.

26

Section 2(0, however, allowed registration of any mark disqualified under the
section 2(e) bars if and when the mark acquired secondary meaning: "Except as
expressly excluded in subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) of this section, nothing
herein shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the27applicant which has
become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce.,
Under the NAFTA amendments in 1993, while the prior rules remained in
place for primarily geographically descriptive marks, registration became virtually
21

Id. at 1371.

SId
23 Id

2' NAFTA Implementation Act, supra note 4.
25 NAFTA, supra note 2.
21 15 U.S.C. ] 1052(e) (1988) (amended 1993).
27 Id § 1052(0.
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impossible for marks deemed to be primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive.2 8 In the amended statute, geographically deceptively misdescriptive
marks, which had previously been treated the same as geographically descriptive
marks, were split off into a separate category. The new version of subsection (e)
prohibited registration of a mark that:
(e) Consists of a mark which (1) when used on or in connection
with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively
misdescriptive of them, (2) when used on or in connection with the
goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive of
them,... (3) when used on or in connection with the goods of the
applicant is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of
them, or (4) is primarily merely a surname.2 9
The purpose of separating geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks into
a separate category was to make it possible, through amendments to section 2(f),
to prohibit registration of any mark in this category even if the mark acquired
secondary meaning. The current version of section 2(f) provides:
(f) Except as expressly excluded in subsections (a), (b), (c), (d),
(e) (3), and (e) (5) of this section, nothing in this chapter shall prevent
the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become
distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce .... Nothing in
this section shall prevent the registration of a mark which, when
used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant, is
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of them, and
which became distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce
before December 8, 1993. 30
Under the new standards, once a mark is determined to be "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive," registration is completely barred under revised
section 2(e) (3). Subject only to the grandfathering exception for marks that had
already achieved distinctiveness prior to NAFTA's effective date,31 geographically

21

See NAFTA, supra note 2.

2" 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1993) (amended 1998). In 1998, a further amendment added a
subsection (e)(5), barring registration of a mark that "comprises any matter that, as a whole, is
functional." Act of Oct. 30, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-330, Title II, 5 201(a)(2), (12), 112 Stat. 3069,

3070.
", 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (2003); see supra note 29 (noting the addition of new subsection (e)(5) in

1998).
" 15 U.S.C. § 1052(b); see supra text accompanying note 30.
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deceptively misdescriptive marks are barred from registration without regard to
whether they have acquired secondary meaning. In other words, they are now
subject to the same fate as marks deemed to be deceptive under section 2(a).
The first Federal Circuit decision to apply these amended provisions to a
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark was the 1999 decision
of In re Wada, which upheld the PTO's application of the well-established twopart test for determining whether a mark was primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive:
"For a mark to be primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive, the mark must (1) have as its primary significance a generally
known geographic place, and (2) identify products that purchasers are likely to
believe mistakenly are connected with that location." 32 This test was essentially
the same as the test applicable to deceptively misdescriptive marks of a nongeographic nature.33 Based on this familiar standard, the Federal Circuit upheld
the determination of the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board that the mark "New
York Ways Gallery" was primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive as
applied to various kinds of luggage and handbag goods that did not have any
connection to New York. As a result, pursuant to the 1993 amendments to
section 2, this mark could not be registered even if the applicant could demonstrate that the mark had acquired secondary meaning.
Two years later, in In re Save Venice New York, Inc.,34 the Federal Circuit again
applied the amended provisions to uphold the TTAB's refusal to register a
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive mark. In this case, the
examiner had refused to register the applicant's composite mark--consisting of
the phrases "Save Venice" and "The Venice Collection" combined with a sketch
of the Lion of St. Mark (a well-known symbol of Venice)-for goods that did not
originate in Venice,35 on the ground that the primary significance of the mark was
geographic, and that "the public would mistakenly believe that Venice, Italy was
the source of applicant's goods."36 The court applied the same two-part test it
had used in In re Wada and the pre-NAFTA cases, found that the test was
satisfied, and therefore upheld the TTAB's rejection under section 2(e)(3). 3

'2 In re Wada, 194 F.3d at 1299-1300 (citing Institut Nat'lDes AppellationsD'Origine, 958 F.2d at
1580).
" See, e.g., In rn Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1959 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(following Shape#, 231 U.S.P.Q. 72); In re Shapely, Inc., 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 72,73 (T.T.A.B. 1986)
(distinguishing the test for "deceptive" marks from the test for "deceptively misdescriptive" marks).
3' In re Save Venice N.Y., Inc., 259 F.3d 1346, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1778 (Fed. Cit. 2001).
'5 Id at 1349.
36 Id at 1350.
3" Id at 1352, 1356.
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CRITICISM OF THE NAFTA AMENDMENTS PRIOR TO

2003

Some scholars responded to the 1993 amendments by arguing that the
resulting harsh consequences-the permanent, nondefeasible ban on registration
of primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks-were not required
by NAFTA, and represented an overly cautious interpretation by Congress of the
requirements imposed by NAFTA.38 When these criticisms are examined in light
of the interpretation of post-NAFTA section 2(e)(3) that prevailed prior to the
Calfornia Innovalionsdecision in 2003, they certainly have merit.
The relevant NAFTA provision is Article 1712, which states in, relevant part,
that:
1. Each Party shall provide, in respect of geographical indications,
the legal means for interested persons to prevent:
(a) the use of any means in the designation or presentation of a
good that indicates or suggests that the good in question originates
in a territory, region or locality other than the true place of origin,
in a manner that misleads the public as to the geographical origin of
the good;
2. Each Party shall, on its own initiative if its domestic law so
permits or at the request of an interested person, refuse to register,
or invalidate the registration of, a trademark containing or consisting of a geographical indication with respect to goods that do not
originate in the indicated territory, region or locality, if use of the
indication in the trademark for such goods is of such a nature as to
39
mislead the public as to the geographical origin of the goods.
Although this provision required the United States to provide legal redress
with respect to "misleading" marks, the notion of what is "misleading" is open
to interpretation. Is a misdescriptive mark always "misleading" if people would
believe it to be true? Or must the misdescription also be a material factor in the
purchasing decision? For example, even if the public believes that "Chicago" root
beer comes from Chicago instead of Milwaukee, if that false belief does not
motivate the purchasing decision, arguably the public has not been "misled" in

" See, e.g., John R. Renaud, Can't Get Therefrom Here: How NAFTA and GATT have Reduced
Proectionfor GeographicalTrademarks, 26 BRi))K. J. INT'I. L. 1097, 1110 (2001).
" NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1712(1)-(2), 32 I.L.M. at 675.
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any meaningful way.4" Moreover, once the "Chicago" mark has acquired
sufficient secondary meaning, most consumers will cease to be confused at all;
they will simply recognize "Chicago" as a mark which identifies the maker of the
root beer, not its geographic source. Therefore, the "Chicago" mark may be
misleading in a technical sense but not in a practical sense, and thus it may not
have been necessary for Congress to bar registration of the "Chicago" mark
completely.
Congress's interpretation of Article 1712 as requiring a complete bar to
registration of primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks, as these
were defined in 1993, was also inconsistent with its own failure to provide a new
legal remedy against users of such marks. A bar to registration of a mark does not
prohibit its use. Article 1712(1) requires signatories to provide "the legal means
for interested persons to prevent . . . the use of" misleading geographic
indicators.4 Yet Congress did not create a new cause of action against parties
who use false indications of geographic origin, and existing remedies under state
law and under the Lanham Act do not necessarily extend to false geographic
indicators that merely confuse but do not deceive. If a geographic indication is
false and confusing, but does not influence the purchasing decision, it is unlikely
to give rise to a cause of action for unfair competition, since the unfair competition provisions of the Lanham Act (and similar state laws) allow a cause of action
only by a party who is injured, or is likely to be injured, by the false origin
indication.42 If consumers' purchasing decisions are not influenced by the

" See Renaud, rupra note 38, at 1110-11 (arguing that Congress should not have enacted the
complete bar to registration of geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks when the
misdescription does not rise to the level of "deception" under section 2(a)-when, in other words,
it does not motivate the purchasing decision).
, NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1712(1), 32 I.L.M. at 675.
4_ Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 1125(a)(1) (2003), provides, in pertnent part,
that:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.
State unfair competition laws also require injury, or likelihood thereof. See, e.g., Boston Shoe Shop
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inaccurate geographical indicator, then a competitor who objects to the use of this
indicator is unlikely to have a legal remedy (other than cancellation of the mark,
if registered) against the user, because the competitor is unlikely to succeed in
demonstrating injury or likelihood of injury.13 It is thus entirely possible for

v. McBroom Shoe Shop, 72 So. 102,103 (Ala. 1916) (noting that a remedy depends on the likelihood
that deceptive use of plaintiff's unregistered mark will injure plaintiff by diverting sales); Weinstein
v. Marks, 42 P. 142, 146 (Cal. 1895) (noting that while there is no property right in a trade name per
se, there is a remedy when the defendant copies it to divert the plaintiff's business); Wood v. Wood's
Homes, Inc., 519 P.2d 1212, 1214-15 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974) (noting that the purpose of an unfair
competition claim is to prevent damage to the plaintiff).
" A similar argument has been used to criticize Congress's enactment of a registration bar, but
no other legal remedy, in the case of false (even if not confusing) geographic indications of origin
with respect to wines and spirits, pursuant to Articles 23 and 24 of the TRIPS Agreement. See Paul
J. Heald, Trademarks and GeographicalIndications: Exploring the Contours of the TRIPS Agreement, 29
VAND.J. TRANSNAT'LL. 635, 651 (1996). Article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that:
Each Member shall provide the legal means for interested parties to prevent use
of a geographical indication identifying wines for wines not originating in the
place indicated by the geographical indication in question or identifying spirits
for spirits not originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication in
question.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 23, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTs-REuI.TS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 1.L.M. 1125, 1197 [hereinafter
TRIPS]. Congress implemented this requirement by amending the Lanham Act to bar registration,
with respect to wines or spirits, of any false geographic indications of origin-a prohibition that
seems broad enough to preclude the use of totally arbitrary marks (analogous to the classic "Alaska"
bananas) as well as nonarbitrary misdescriptive geographic marks that nonetheless have achieved
distinctiveness through secondary meaning. See § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (barring registration of
any mark, used in connection with wines or spirits, which "identifies a place other than the origin
of the goods," if its first such use commences on or afterJanuary 1, 1996). If the TRIPS provision
requiring a remedy for such false origin indicators means that harmlessly false marks must be barred
from registration, Heald argues, then surely it must also require creation of a remedy against users
of such marks when they are unregistered. Heald, supra, at 646-49. Yet neither federal nor state law
provides a remedy against users of false but harmless unregistered marks. Heald's argument with
respect to the section 2(a) TRIPS amendment is somewhat stronger than the analogous argument
with respect to the section 2(e) NAFTA amendment, since Article 23 of TRIPS seems to mandate
a remedy even for arbitrar, geographic marks when used in connection with wines and spirits, a
remedy clearly not contemplated in the Lanham Act or comparable state laws (perhaps because it
is difficult to imagine a truly arbitrary geographic mark for wines and spirits). See 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(B) (2003) (allowing a cause of action for misrepresenting geographic origin, but only if
the plaintiff is likely to be damaged). Nonetheless, the same analysis as applied to section 2(e) does
reveal an inconsistency between imposing a complete ban on registering harmlessly confusing
geographic marks and failing to enact any affirmative remedy against users of such marks who
choose not to register them (or who continue to use them after their registration has been refused
or cancelled). In one respect, the argument is stronger in the section 2(e) context than in the section
2(a) context, because Article 23 of TRIPS (dealing with wines and spirits) expressly allows signatories
to choose "enforcement by administrative action," a mode of enforcement that arguably would apply
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someone to use a geographically confusing mark without incurring any negative
legal consequence, so long as the user is content to use an unregistered mark.
Thus, if Article 1712 truly required Congress to impose a complete ban on
registration of harmlessly confusing geographic marks, surely it also required
Congress to provide a cause of action against users of such marks when they are
unregistered.
Finally, as understood prior to CalforniaInnovations, the complete bar under
section 2(e)(3) extended even to false geographic marks that had acquired strong
secondary meaning. However, the existence of strong secondary meaning
eliminates any significant likelihood of confusion that could injure a competitor,
and thus forecloses a claim of unfair competition under the Lanham Act.44 Thus,
false but nonarbitrary geographic marks might not confuse anyone at all once they
have acquired secondary meaning, and thus might not support a cause of action
under section 43(a), yet section 2(e)(3) completely bars their registration. If
Article 1712 required Congress to disregard secondary meaning in barring
registration of such marks, surely it also required Congress to provide a legal
remedy against users of such marks even when the marks had acquired secondary
meaning.
Congress's enactment, in response to NAFTA, of a broad ban on registration
of non-arbitrary geographically misdescriptive marks, regardless of secondary
meaning or likely impact on purchasing decisions, thus seems inconsistent with
Congress's failure to enact any cause of action for damages or injunctive relief
against those who use such indicators as trademarks.

only to registered marks. TRIPS, supra, art. 23 n.4, 32 I.L.M. at 1205. Article 1712(2) of NAFTA,
in contrast, deals separately with refusal or cancellation of trademark registrations, thus implying that
the general redress requirement of Article 1712(1) mandates broader legal remedies. NAFTA, supra
note 2, art. 1712(2), 32 I.L.M. at 675.
" See Renaud, supra note 38, at 1109 n.66. Renaud gives the examples of In re Texas Steakhouse
of Roanoke, Inc., No. 74/595, 919 1997 TTAB LEXIS 162 (T.T.A.B. June 18, 1997) (denying
registration for the mark "Texas Steakhouse & Saloon" for a restaurant chain not based in Texas);
Fred Haywan Bever# Hills, Inc. v. Jacques Bernier,Inc., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1691 (T.T.A.B. 1996)
(sustaining opposition to registration of "Rodeo Drive" for perfume not produced on Rodeo Drive).
Surely the steakhouse patrons do not believe they have suddenly been transported to Texas, or even
that their food and beverages came from Texas, and surely the buyers of Fred Hayman's expensive
perfume do not believe that Rodeo Drive, an area known for expensive real estate and upscale
shopping, is a place where perfume is actually manufactured and bottled.
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II. CALIFORNIA INNOVATIONS AND LES HALLES: OVERLY AGGRESSIVE
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NAFTA AMENDMENTS
A. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S RATIONALE

Perhaps heeding some of these criticisms, in 2003 the Federal Circuit revisited
its interpretation of section 2(e)(3) in two cases decided just a few months
apart-Inre CalforniaInnovations, Inc.45 and In re Les Halles de ParisJ.V. 4 6 Both cases
involved geographically inaccurate marks that were neither arbitrary nor deceptive
(under the "material factor" test). In other words, like the "Chicago" mark for
root beer made in Milwaukee, these marks could lead a consumer to believe that
they were accurate indicators of the geographic origin of the goods or services to
which they were applied. However, this false belief regarding geographic origins
would probably not be a material factor in consumers' purchasing decisions, and
might, in time, be completely negated by the emergence of secondary meaning.
In contrast to its previous decisions in In re Wada and In re Save Venice, New
York, in which the court had interpreted the NAFTA amendments to section 2(e)
as incorporating the familiar two-part test for determining whether a mark was
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive (but not deceptive under
section 2(a)), the Federal Circuit held in CaliforniaInnovationsthat a geographically
inaccurate mark would be barred from registration under section 2(e)(3) only if
the geographic falsehood would also be a material factor in a purchaser's buying
decision.47 In the court's words, "NAFTA and its implementing legislation
obliterated the distinction between geographically deceptive marks and primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks."48 As a result, the court held
that the section 2(e)(3) registration bar would apply to the "California Innovations" trademark only if that mark satisfied the more stringent three-part test that
had, heretofore, determined whether a geographic mark was "deceptive" under
section 2(a):
Thus, due to the NAFTA changes in the Lanham Act, the PTO
must deny registration under § 1052(e)(3) if (1) the primary
significance of the mark is a generally known geographic location,
(2) the consuming public is likely to believe the place identified by

45 329 F.3d 1334, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1853 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
- 334 F.3d 1371, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
17 CompareIn rrWada, 194 F.3d 1297,52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1999), andIn re Save
Venice N.Y., Inc., 259 F.3d 1346, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1778 (Fed. Cir. 2001), with In re Cal.
Innovations, 329 F.3d at 1340.
418In re Cal Innovations, 329 F.3d at 1338 (emphasis added).
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the mark indicates the origin of the goods bearing the mark, when
in fact the goods do not come from that place, and (3) the misrepre49
sentation was a material factor in the consumer's decision.
The court justified its decision to import the section 2(a) standard into section
2(e)(3) by pointing out that, as a result of the NAFTA amendments, the legal
consequences of finding section 2(e)(3) applicable to a geographic mark (i.e., a
complete bar to registration) were identical to the legal consequences of finding
section 2(a) applicable to that mark; accordingly, the legal tests for applying those
provisions should be identical as well:
Thus, § 1052 no longer treats geographically deceptively
misdescriptive marks differently from geographically deceptive
marks. Like geographically deceptive marks, the analysis for
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks under 5
1052(e)(3) focuses on deception of,or fraud on, the consumer. The
classifications under the new § 1052 clarify that these two deceptive
categories both receive permanent rejection. Accordingly, the test
for rejecting a deceptively misdescriptive mark is no longer simple
lack of distinctiveness, but the higher showing of deceptiveness.
The legislative history of the NAFTA Act confirms the change
in standard for geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks. In
a congressional record statement, which appears to be the equivalent of a committee report, the Senate Judiciary Committee
acknowledges the new standard for these marks:
[T]he bill creates a distinction in subsection 2(e) of the
Trademark Act between geographically "descriptive" and
"misdescriptive" marks and amends subsections 2(f) and 2(a)
of the Act to preclude registration of "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive" marks on the principal and
supplemental registers, respectively. The law as it relates to
"primarily geographically descriptive" marks would remain
0
unchanged."
The amended Lanham Act gives geographically deceptively
misdescriptive marks the same treatment as geographically deceptive marks under § 1052(a). Because both of these categories are
subject to permanent denial of registration, the PTO may not
simply rely on lack of distinctiveness to deny registration, but must

49 Id. at 1341.

'o 139 CONG. REc. S16,092-01 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1993) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
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make the more difficult showing of public deception. In other
words, by placing geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks
under subsection (e)(3) in the same fatal circumstances as deceptive
marks under subsection (a), the NAFTA Act also elevated the
standards for identifying those deceptive marks.5 '
Two months after deciding CalforniaInnovations,the Federal Circuit applied the
same holding to service marks in Les Halles,5 2 which was decided by a panel
including two out of the same three judges from the CaliforniaInnovations panel.5 3
Because services rather than goods were involved, the court applied the
heightened "association" test-that is, the requirement that consumers of the
service "are likely to believe the . . . services have their origin in the location
indicated by the mark," or, in other words, "that patrons will likely be misled to
make some meaningful connection between the ... [service] and the relevant
place." 4 As it did for trademarks in CaliforniaInnovations,however, the court held
that for service marks to be subject to the section 2(e)(3) bar, "the misleading
services-place association must be a material factor in the consumer's decision to
patronize" the services-in this case, a restaurant named after a well-known
district in Paris. 5 Because the evidence presented to the TTAB did not establish
a "material services-place association," the court vacated the Board's decision. 6
Unfortunately, as discussed below, the court's analysis of section 2(e)(3) in
California Innovations and Les Halles is unwarranted by the text or the legislative
history of the NAFTA amendments, and renders portions of section 2 inoperative or superfluous.

"' In rr Cal.Innovations, 329 F.3d at 1339-40.
12 In re Les Halles, 334 F.3d 1371.
" California Innovations was heard by Judges Rader, Newman, and Clevenger. Les Halks was
heard by Judges Rader, Newman and Dyk. Judge Rader authored both opinions.
5' In reLes Halks, 334 F.3d at 1374.
55 Id.
6 Id. at 1375. In this case, the court held that not only did the record fail to "show that a
material reason for the diner's choice of this restaurant in New York City was its identity with the
region in Paris," the record even failed to show that a diner "would identify the region in Paris as
a source of those restaurant services." Id. At most, the court concluded, the record showed "that
Les Halles' restaurant conjures up memories or images of the Le Marais area of Paris." Id. Thus, the
court in Les Halks, 334 F.3d 1371, might have reached the same result in this case under the less
demanding two-part test that would have applied prior to the NAFTA amendments. In other
words, the court's invocation of the materiality requirement of CakforniaInnovations, 329 F.3d 1334,
might not have been outcome-determinative in this case.
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PROBLEMS WITH THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS

The CaliforniaInnovations court may have jumped too readily to its conclusion
that Congress intended to impose the section 2(a) standard of deception as a
prerequisite to imposing the section 2(e) (3) registration bar. It is true, as the court
observed, that "[t]he classifications under the new § 1052 clarify that these two
deceptive categories both receive permanent rejection." 7 However, the court
made too great a leap when it concluded that Congress's decision to bar
registration of both classes of disfavored marks necessarily implied that the same
legal test should apply to determine which marks fall into each category:
"Accordingly, the test for rejecting a deceptively misdescriptive mark is no longer
simple lack of distinctiveness, but the higher showing of deceptiveness." 8 After
all, if Congress had intended for both the same legal test and the same legal
consequences to apply, it makes little sense for Congress to have retained two
separate categories for these marks rather than combine them into one. 9
Under section 2(a), for example, several different types of marks are barred
from registration-not only deceptive marks, but also marks deemed immoral,
scandalous, or disparaging.6" Although each of these categories of disfavored
marks suffers the same legal consequence-a complete bar to registration-these
categories are not defined by the same legal test as deceptive marks.61 If they
were, of course, there would be no need for separate categories. Indeed, the
complete bar applies to marks described in section 2(b), 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e)(5) as
well, yet the legal tests which determine whether a mark fits into these categories
are distinctly different.
Similarly, under section 2(e), several types of marks are presumptively barred
from registration, but may be registered upon a showing of acquired distinctive-

v In re Cal. Innovations,329 F.3d at 1339.
s Id. at 1339.
s Of course, if Congress had intended to treat geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks
as a type of deceptive mark under section 2(a), Congress would have had to draft the grandfathering
clause of section 2() a bit differently, but it could easily have done so, as follows:
With respect to marks deemed deceptive under section 2(a) solely because they
are likely to mislead consumers with respect to the geographic origin of goods
(other than wine or spirits), registration shall not be barred if the mark became
distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce before December 8, 1993.
'0 Lanham Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2003).
61 See, e.g., Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F. Supp. 2d 96,124,68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1247
(D.D.C. 2003) (distinguishing between the legal tests for "scandalous" and "disparaging" marks).
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ness under section 2(f). 62 Again, the same legal consequence applies to each
category, but the categories are not all defined by the same legal test.
Accordingly, contrary to the reasoning of California Innovations, the mere fact
that Congress subjected two types of marks to similar legal consequences does not
necessarily mean that both types of marks are subject to the same legal test to
determine whether they fall into a disfavored class.
Although the legislative history of the NAFTA amendments is sparse, it seems
indisputable that Congress modified sections 2(e) and (f) to impose a complete
bar on registration of marks that are primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive, and that it made this choice based on a perception-whether or
not correct-that a complete bar, rather than a defeasible bar, was required by
Article 1712. This certainly was the assumption of the CaliforniaInnovationscourt,
and there is no evidence that Congress had any other motivation to make these
changes.
The only type of mark addressed in Article 1712 of NAFTA is a mark which
"misleads the public as to the geographical origin of the good. '6 3 Thus, once
Congress determined that Article 1712 required a complete ban on registration of
primarily geographically misdescriptive marks, the logical step was to move these
marks from the defeasiby unregistrable category to the conclusively unregistrable
category. In other words, Congress changed sections 2(e) and (f) in a way that
would subject this class of marks to a more stringent negative consequence than
that to which they had previously been subject. That this was Congress's intent
is evident from the Senate Report accompanying the 1993 amendments:
Paragraphs two and three of Article 1712 require NAFTA governments to refuse to register marks that are deceptively misdescriptive
in respect of geographic origin regardless of whether the mark has
acquired distinctiveness. By contrast, the article does not prohibit
the registration of primarily geographically descriptive marks.
In light of this difference in treatment, section 333 of the bill
creates a distinction in subsection 2(e) of the Trademark Act
between geographically "descriptive" and "misdescriptive" marks
and amends subsections 2(f) and 23(a) of the Act to preclude
registration of "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive"
marks on the principal and supplemental registers, respectively.

15 U.S.C. § 1052(e). In addition to marks that are primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive, section 2(e) also presumptively bars registration of descriptive and deceptively
misdescriptive nongeographic marks, primarily geographically descriptive marks, and marks that are
primarily merely surnames.
63 NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1712, 32 J.L.M. at 675.
62
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The law as it relates to "primarily geographically descriptive" marks
would remain unchanged.
The bill contains a grandfather clause that covers U.S. marks
containing geographical terms that are in use or registered prior to
the date of enactment.64
The term "primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks" which
is used in this passage is the exact statutory phrase from section 2(e); it is not a
phrase that appears in NAFTA, which instead refers to marks that "mislead[] the
public as to the geographical origin of the good., 6' Thus, it is clear from the
Senate Report that Congress intended to completely preclude registration for the
very same types of geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks that would,
under prior law, have been registrable upon a sufficient showing of acquired
distinctiveness. In imposing this complete bar, the only exception Congress
recognized was for marks that had already achieved distinctiveness under prior
law. 6 There is no evidence that Congress intended to exempt any other
subcategory of geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks from the new rule
of preclusion.
In spite of this clear evidence of congressional intent to raise the bar for this
entire class of marks, the California Innovations decision necessarily implies that
Congress intended to relax the registration rules for at least some members of this
class of marks, by making it harder for a mark to fall into the "primarily
geographically deceptively misdescriptive" category in the first place, and thus
making it more likely that a nonarbitrary geographically false mark would be
eligible for registration even in the absence of secondary meaning.67 As illustrated
by the Senate Report, Congress indicated no intention to narrow the definition
of a "primarily geographically misdescriptive mark" by removing certain marks
from this category." Yet this isprecisely the consequence of the California
Innovations decision.
For example, prior to the NAFTA amendments, the "Chicago" mark for root
beer made in Milwaukee would have been defeasibly unregistrable, because
consumers would probably believe that the root beer was made in Chicago, even
if this false belief would not have materially influenced their buying decision.
Only upon a showing of secondary meaning would the mark have become
registrable.

64 S. REP. No. 103-189, at 124 (1993).
65 Compare § 2(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), with NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1712, 32 I.L.M. at 675.

- § 2(0, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0.
67 In reCal Innovations, 329 F.3d at 339.
68 S. REP. No. 103-189, at 124 (1993).
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Applying the CaliforniaInnovationsinterpretation of the NAFTA amendments,
however, the "Chicago" mark would be subject neither to a complete bar nor to a
defeasible bar. In other words, it could be registered without even a showing of
secondary meaning. This follows because "Chicago" would not be deceptive
under the "material factor" test imposed by California Innovations, and therefore
would not fall under either section 2(e) or section 2(a).69 Accordingly, it would
be registrable without a showing of distinctiveness-exactly like the arbitrary
"Alaska" mark for bananas.
When Congress amended section 2 of the Lanham Act as part of the
implementation of the NAFTA agreement, it seems highly improbable that
Congress's response to NAFTA's mandate to prevent the use of misleading
geographic indicators would be to make it easier to register a misdescriptive
geographic mark. In the unlikely event that Congress did intend to ease the
restrictions on false geographic indications, surely this intent would have been
evidenced somewhere in the legislative history of the amendments. Yet no such
indications of intent exist. It therefore appears that the Federal Circuit has
misconstrued the intent behind the NAFTA amendments, and that its new
interpretation of these provisions frustrates the intent of Congress.
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit's interpretation appears to make section
2(e) (3) superfluous. By subjecting geographic trademarks to the registration bar
of section 2(e)(3) only if they are also deceptive marks, California Innovations
guarantees that, henceforth, every mark barred under section 2(e)(3) would also
have been barred under section 2(a). Had Congress intended this result, it would
have been simpler to remove geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks
from section 2(e) altogether.
By interpreting section 2(e)(3) in a manner that makes it superfluous in light
of section 2(a), the Federal Circuit violated one of the settled canons of statutory
construction. It is "a cardinal rule of statutory construction.., that a legislature
is presumed to have used no superfluous words." 7 Therefore, "[i]t is the duty of
the court to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute."'"
Ironically, it was this very canon on which the Federal Circuit's predecessor court
relied in its 1982 decision in In re Nantucket, when it articulated the first authoritative interpretation of the meaning of "primarily geographically deceptively
misdescriptive" marks in the pre-NAFTA version of section 2(e) in order to
distinguish these from truly "deceptive" marks under section 2(a).72

69 In re CaL Innovations, 329 F.3d at 1339.

In reNantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95, 98,213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 889,890 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (quoting
Platt v. Union Pac. R.R., 99 U.S. 48, 58 (1878); Tabor v. Ulloa, 323 F.2d 823, 824 (9th Cir. 1963)).
71 Id. (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1882)).
72 In re Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 99; see supranote 11 and accompanying text. Although earlier case
70
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CaliforniaInnovations also appears to violate a second fundamental canon of
statutory construction. By requiring a geographic misdescription to be material
in order to establish that it is "deceptively misdescriptive" under section 2(e)(3),
without imposing this same materiality requirement on "deceptively
misdescriptive" nongeographic marks under section 2(e)(1), the Federal Circuit
gave the term "deceptively misdescriptive" two different meanings within the
same statutory subsection. As its predecessor court observed in In re Nantucket.
Each part or section of a statute should be construed in connection
with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious
whole, and it is not proper to confine interpretation to the one
section to be construed. These rules of statutory construction
prohibit differing treatment of "deceptively misdescriptive" in 55
2(e)(1) and 2(e)(2)." 3
Furthermore, under the NAFTA amendments, there is only one category of
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks under section 2(e)(3)
that remains registrable-those which became distinctive prior to December 8,
1993. 7" Ironically, the effect of the California Innovations holding that section
2(e)(3) bars only material misdescriptions of geographic origin is that this
grandfathering now applies exclusively to deceptive geographic marks that became
distinctive prior to that date. Is it even possible for a deceptive mark to be
distinctive? The answer is unclear, since courts have never had to address this
question. In the past, deceptive marks could never be salvaged through acquired
distinctiveness. That remains the case for nongeographic deceptive marks under
section 2(a). It is difficult to believe therefore, that Congress intended to change
this result in the case of deceptive geographic marks. As a result of California
Innovations, however, all marks that are unregistrable under section 2(e)(3) are also

law struggled to articulate the distinction between sections 2(a) and 2(e)(3), there was no doubt that
Congress intended them to differ in scope:
That the persons instrumental in the framing of the Lanham Act attributed
different meanings to the terms 'deceptive' and 'primarily geographically
deceptively misdescriptive' and intended these terms to be applied in different
situations involving different sets of circumstances is obvious not only from the
fact that these designations appear in two different subsections of Section 2 of
the Statute, but from the specific language in Sections 2(t) and 23 thereof.
In re Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 687,690 (T.T.A.B. 1969); accord,In re Charles S. Loeb Pipes, Inc.,
190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 238, 241 (T.T.A.B. 1976) (quoting In re Amerise, 160 U.S.P.Q. 687).
71 In re Nantucket, 677 F.2d at 98-9 (citations omitted) (citing NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S.
282, 288-90 (1957); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962)); see spra note 11 and
accompanying text.
74

§ 2(f), 15 U.S.C. S 1052(o.
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unregistrable under section 2(a). Since the grandfathering clause of section 2(f)
by its own terms applies to section 2(e)(3) but not to section 2(a),"5 does it or does
it not permit registration of deceptive geographic marks that acquired distinctiveness before NAFTA took effect? California Innovations makes this question
impossible to answer, but leaves open only two possibilities: Either deceptive
geographic marks can be registered if they became distinctive before December
8, 1993, or instead, marks disqualified under section 2(e)( 3 ) can never be
registered, because they are also, by definition, deceptive under section 2(a), in
which case the grandfathering clause in section 2() is altogether inoperative
because there is no mark to which it can ever apply.76 The first of these
interpretations is unlikely to have been the intent of Congress, since it would
permit registration of marks that are deceptive and therefore injurious to the
public, as well as actionable under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act." The second
interpretation renders section 2(f) inoperative, and amounts to another violation
of settled canons of statutory construction."
After announcing that the "material factor" test of section 2(a) would
determine whether section 2(e)(3) applies to a geographic mark, the California
Innovations court drew a distinction that seems semantic rather than substantive:
As a result of the NAFTA changes to the Lanham Act, geographic
deception is specifically dealt with in subsection (e)(3), while
deception in general continues to be addressed under subsection (a).
Consequently, this court anticipates that the PTO will usually
address geographically deceptive marks under subsection (e)(3) of
the amended Lanham Act rather than subsection (a). While there

75 Id.
76 On the other hand, the wording of the grandfathering clause is so inexplicably broad that,
taken on its face, it would allow any mark to be registered if it became distinctive prior to December
8, 1993-including scandalous, immoral, disparaging, confusing, descriptive, and deceptive marks.
The clause reads:

Nothing in this section shall prevent the registration of a mark which, when used on
or in connection with the goods of the applicant, is primarily geographically
deceptively misdescriptive of them, and which became distinctive of the
applicant's goods in commerce before Dec. 8, 1993.
Id. (emphasis added). The word "section," if taken literally, would refer to all of section 2, including
all of the bars contained in sections 2(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e). Surely Congress did not intend to
create an amnesty program for all previously unregistrable marks that had acquired distinctiveness
prior to the NAFTA Implementation Act, supranote 4. Such careless drafting, however, combined
with the absence of any meaningful legislative history, suggests that Congress did not subject the
NAFTA amendments to sufficient scrutiny before enactment.
77 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
78 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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are identical legal standards for deception in each section, subsection (e)(3) specifically involves deception involving geographic
marks .

What possible substantive effect would follow from this distinction? If a mark
is geographic and deceptive, it will be rejected under 2(e)(3). If a mark is
nongeographic and deceptive, it will be rejected under 2(a). If the court's
admonition to recognize these as two distinct grounds for rejection has any
substance at all, then there must be some difference in the legal consequences of
2(a) and 2(e) (3) rejections, but what could that difference be? The only difference
supportable by the text of the statute is that pre-1993 grandfathering under 2(f)
would be available to 2(e)(3) deceptive marks but not to 2(a) deceptive marks.
Yet surely it could not have been Congress's intent to extend registration to any
class of deceptive marks, even if they arguably acquired distinctiveness prior to
December 8, 1993. However, unless the Federal Circuit was drawing a purely
semantic and pointless distinction, this grandfathering of pre-1993 deceptive
geographic marks-and their resulting registrability-would be the logical
consequence of the court's holding, and the consequence of the NAFTA
amendments would be to relax the registration rules for some truly deceptive
geographic marks as well as for merely confusing geographic marks. This
outcome would be inconsistent with the Federal Circuit's own conclusion that the
NAFTA treaty "shifts the emphasis80 for geographically descriptive marks to
prevention of any public deception."
Therefore, under the Federal Circuit's analysis, either section 2(e)(3) is
completely superfluous, or it relaxes the former section 2(a) ban on registration
of truly deceptive geographic marks to the extent they now qualify for
grandfathering under section 2(f. The first conclusion runs afoul of settled
canons of statutory interpretation, and the second would introduce such a
dramatic change in federal trademark law-and one arguably contrary to the letter
and spirit of Article 1712-that it would be astonishing for Congress to effect
such a change without any indication in the legislative history that it understood
and intended this effect.
The Federal Circuit acknowledged in California Innovafions that its previous
decisions interpreting the NAFTA amendments to section 2-In re Wada and In
re Save Venice New York, Inc.-had not expressly required a showing of materiality
8
in holding that the marks in those cases were barred under section 2(e)(3).
However, the court asserted that in retrospect, both of the marks rejected in those

7 In reCal.Innovalions, 329 F.3d at 1341-42.
'0Id.at 1339.
"I Id.at 1340-41 (discussing In reSave Venice, 259 F.3d 1346; In reWada, 194 F.3d 1297).
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cases did in fact, meet its newly articulated materiality test, because In re Wada
noted that New York was "not only well-known, but renowned for the products
at issue," 82 and In re Save Venice concluded that Venice was known for producing
the types of products that were to be offered under the applicant's marks.83
Regardless of whether the evidentiary record in either of those cases would have
supported a finding of materiality, however-a conclusion that is far less certain
than the Federal Circuit suggests-the Federal Circuit did not, in either case,
actually articulate a standard any higher than the traditional two-part test, and in
neither case did the court even mention the concept of materiality.84
III. CONCLUSION
In California Innovations, the Federal Circuit unnecessarily introduced a
dramatically new interpretation of what it means for a geographic mark to be
"deceptively misdescriptive." In so doing, the court failed to observe the most
basic canons of statutory construction, rendering section 2(e)(3) of the Lanham
Act superfluous and the last sentence of section 2(f) arguably inoperative.
Furthermore, nothing in the legislative history of this statutory language supports
the court's interpretation.
There is a simpler and more logical way to interpret the NAFTA amendments
to section 2: Congress simply retained the familiar two-part test for identifying
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks, but chose to impose
a conclusive ban on registration of such marks, just as it imposes a conclusive ban
on, interalia,deceptive, scandalous, immoral, disparaging, or functional marks. In
so doing, rather than upset settled pre-NAFTA expectations, it grandfathered any
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive marks (unless also deceptive
under section 2(a)) that had already achieved distinctiveness under the preNAFTA trademark regime, which for several decades had permitted such marks
to be registered once they acquired distinctiveness. Moreover, Congress retained
the older, more flexible standard (i.e., the presumptive registration ban, defeasible
under section 2(f through acquired distinctiveness) for deceptively misdescriptive
nongeographic marks, because it intended to subject inaccurate geographic marks
to more rigorous standards than inaccurate nongeographic marks, which were not
a concern of NAFTA. This interpretation is consistent with the Federal Circuit's
earliest interpretations of the NAFTA amendments in In re Wada and In re Save
Venice, notwithstanding the court's revisionist reinterpretation of those decisions

82 Id. at 1341 (citing In reWada, 194 F.3d at 1299-1300).

Id. at 1341 (citing In re Save Venice, 259 F.3d at 1350, 1354).
4 In re Wada was decided by Judges Plager, Schall, and Gajarsa. In re Save Venice was decided
by Judges Michel, Gajarsa, and Dyk. Judge Gajarsa wrote both opinions.
'3
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in California Innovaions. And it is the only interpretation under which section
2(e)(3) and section 2(f) are fully operative provisions.
Under this more logical interpretation, it would indeed be more difficult to
register a false geographic mark in the post-NAFTA regime. And Congress may
indeed have imposed an unnecessarily harsh consequence when it made that
choice. It may have erred in believing that Article 1712 of NAFTA mandated this
change in policy. But this is the only reading of the NAFTA amendments that
makes sense and conforms to the fundamental rules of statutory construction.
Ironically, when the Federal Circuit chose to adopt a strained interpretation
of the plain language of section 2(e)(3) in CaliforniaInnovayions and Les Halles, its
holding made it easier to register geographically confusing marks than other types
of confusing marks. Yet there is no indication in the NAFTA amendments, or
their legislative history, that Congress intended such disparate results. The more
logical inference is that Congress intended to make geographically confusing
marks impossible to register, even where the misleading nature of the mark is
immaterial to the purchasing decision, based on the belief that Article 1712
requires NAFTA members to ban registration of all geographically confusing
marks.
If Congress erred in the choices it made in 1993, the Federal Circuit's
aggressive recasting of section 2(e)(3) is merely a second wrong that compounds,
rather than corrects, this legislative error. The court should reconsider its
holdings in CaliforniaInnovations and Les Halles, and leave Congress to reconsider
the wisdom of the NAFTA amendments.
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